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FAITH IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
Shami Chakrabarti
INTRODUCTION
When people discuss different equality rights conflicting with
each other, they often have in mind conflicts between religious
beliefs and gender or sexual orientation rights. Conflicts between
other equality rights seem (so far at least) to arise less frequently.
Economic difficulties and increased competition for resources
may change this, but my right not to be discriminated against (at
least directly) on the grounds of my sex or race rarely causes
difficulties for others. Equally, it is difficult to think of examples
where preventing discrimination on the grounds of disability,
sexual orientation, or age will involve significant compromise to
someone else’s protected rights.
The challenge (and the point) of religious and philosophical
beliefs is that they inevitably invoke moral structures, which are
not universally shared, and which may not be reflected in modern
legal norms. For example, many religions are based on ancient
doctrines reflecting patriarchal ideals. This inevitably leads to
conflict between those beliefs and the rights of people of different
faiths or consciences, women, or gay people.
But these specific and predictable conflicts are not the only
problems. Issues of particular faith identity (or the lack thereof)
seem to have become particular sore points in our cultural
discourse at both the national and local level. You hear of people
taking personal exception to accommodations being granted to a
fellow employee on the grounds of his or her religion. Their
reasoning is that it’s “not fair” for someone to be allowed time
* Shami Chakrabarti has been the Director of the U.K. human rights group
Liberty since September 2003.
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off for religious observance when others are not allowed to leave
early, for example, to play sport. I suspect you would not hear
the same complaints—at least not so publicly—about
accommodations being made for disabled employees or perhaps
even for female colleagues with childcare difficulties.
Ten years ago, the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief)
Regulations of 20031 came into force in the U.K., and have
subsequently been superseded by the Equality Act of 2010.2 It has
also been thirteen years since the Human Rights Act of 1998
came into force incorporating Article 9 (freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion) of the European Convention on Human
Rights into the U.K.’s domestic law.3 The cases about faith in the
public sphere have generated some of the most outspoken
commentary, in part because of the huge divergence in views
towards religion in the U.K.
Some people have adopted a new breed of aggressive
secularism (perhaps an inevitable instinctive response to the rise
of international fundamentalist Christian and Islamic movements)
that seeks to eradicate religion from public life altogether.4
Meanwhile, there are substantial minorities of individuals with
strongly held religious beliefs involving strict doctrine and
practice. Some traditionalists mourn a perceived decline in the
Church of England as dominant faith in the land.5
Others have encouraged a political and legislative culture that
conflates irritation, offence, alarm and distress, as evidenced by
our public order and anti-social behavior statute books and
1

The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations, 2003, S.I.
1660, § 2 (U.K.).
2
The Equality Act, 2010, c. 15 (U.K.).
3
Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 6 (U.K.).
4
See, e.g., Christina Odone, The New Intolerance: Will We Regret
Pushing Christians Out of Public Life, NEW STATESMAN (Jan. 14, 2014,
11:12 AM), http://www.newstatesman.com/2014/01/pushing-christians-outpublic-life-new-intolerance.
5
See, e.g., George Carey, An Age When All Faiths are Equal –
Except Christianity, MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 31, 2013, 7:43 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.U.K./debate/article-2482441/An-age-faiths-equal-Christianity-As-judge-says-Christian-morality-place-courts-stinging-riposteArchbishop-Canterbury.html.
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promotes a general fear of difference and dissent.6 This in turn
produces both the nonsense of nervous “Winterval” celebrations7
and the disgrace of a young British man being arrested for calling
Scientology a cult.8 There has also been an increase in hostility
towards religious minorities which has manifested itself recently
in calls to ban the wearing of the burkha in public places, most
vocally and stringently in continental Europe, but also in the
U.K.9
Society has three choices in dealing with the question of the
extent to which people have the right to express their religion in
the public sphere. The first choice is to select and elevate an
approved faith to the point of giving it dominant status over all
other belief systems. That faith is completely and formally
interweaved into the entire legal, political, and social system—
every sphere of public life and as much of private life as can be
achieved. An extreme example might be Afghanistan under the
Taliban, and a more moderate example would be Britain at earlier
stages in its history.
The second option is in many ways both equal and opposite.
It is based on the view that faith conviction should be viewed as
dangerous and divisive. If faith conviction cannot be eradicated
altogether, it must be chased from the public to the private
sphere—confined to a place of worship, the home, or upstairs
under the bed with the pornography. An extreme example would
be Stalin’s Russia, and a more moderate one would be the French
See, e.g., George Monbiot, At Last, A Law to Stop Almost Anyone
From Doing Almost Anything, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2014, 2:30 PM),
6

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/06/law-to-stop-eveyoneeverything.
7
Winterval was the name given to Birmingham City Council public
events in 1997 and 1998. “Winterval” has since become shorthand in the U.K.
for attempts to “rebrand” Christmas so as not to exclude non-Christians.
8
See Anil Danwar, Teenager Faces Prosecution for Calling
Scientology “Cult,” THE GUARDIAN (May 20, 2008, 4:53 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/U.K./2008/may/20/1.
9
See, e.g., George Eaton, Tory MP’s Ban the Burqa
Bill Reaches Parliament, NEW STATESMAN (Sept. 6, 2013),
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/09/tory-mps-ban-burqa-billreaches-parliament.
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Republic.
There is also a third option: a more human rights-based
approach and one that resonates well with a society like Britain,
a country where the struggle for religious freedom has been so
connected with the struggle for democracy itself.
Human beings are creatures of faith and logic, emotion and
reason, and this is reflected in the law. It may be true that
religion has inspired considerable war and prejudice, but it has
also been responsible for art, music, and compassion. While
scientists and engineers have produced some of the greatest
advancements in human history, their work has also been the
stuff of nightmares. If we really believe in freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion, then such freedom must include the
right to the faith or belief of your choice, the right to no faith,
and crucially, to be a heretic to any religion.
Inseparable, enumerated rights like freedom of conscience,
expression, and association, and the right to private and family
life, all flow from foundational human rights ideals of dignity,
equal treatment, and fairness. Lord Nicholls in Williamson (a
case concerning corporal punishment in schools) said:
Religious and other beliefs and convictions are part
of the humanity of every individual. They are an
integral part of his personality and individuality. In
a civilised society individuals respect each other’s
beliefs. This enables them to live in harmony. This
is one of the hallmarks of a civilised society.
Unhappily, all too often this hallmark has been
noticeable by its absence. Mutual tolerance has had
a chequered history even in recent times. The
history of most countries, if not all, has been
marred by the evil consequences of religious and
other intolerance.10
Some of those historical examples highlight one of the largest
dangers that can arise from religious discrimination, namely
religion being used as a proxy for race. Sadly, this is not a
10

Regina (Williamson & Others) v. Sec’y of State for Educ. & Emp’t,
[2005] UKHL 15, at [15] (appeal taken from Eng.).
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phenomenon confined to history, as is amply demonstrated by the
evolving—and increasingly toxic—debate on the wearing of the
burkha in public spaces, which is considered below.
As with other forms of individual expression and autonomy,
we should be slow to interfere with the expression or
manifestation of any religious or other belief—doing so only
when such intervention is necessary and proportionate to
protecting the rights and freedoms of others. This can of course
be a difficult exercise in practice, and there are a collection of
core issues which have proved consistently controversial.
In this Article, I focus on two issues. First, I consider what
religious and philosophical beliefs the law deems to be worthy of
protection. I will look at cases that discuss the scope of
“philosophical belief” in the U.K. Employment Appeal Tribunal,
the seminal decision of the European Court of Human Rights in
Eweida v. United Kingdom,11 which considers the issue of beliefs
held by relatively few people, and a subsequent decision in a
U.K. Tax Tribunal on the same issue. Second, I consider how far
the law requires us to go to protect the manifestation of those
beliefs. Specifically, I will analyze the legal position of public
officials and business owners providing services to the public and
the rights of individuals to wear religious clothing in public, both
in the U.K. and in France. Finally, I will conclude by analyzing
recent developments in the European Court of Human Rights’
approach to religious freedom.
I. WHICH RELIGIONS, BELIEFS,
WORTHY OF PROTECTION?

OR

MANIFESTATIONS ARE

How serious does a belief have to be in order to deserve
protection? While U.K. courts and the European Court of Human
Rights have said such a belief must “attain a certain level of
cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance,”12 what does that
mean? How do you draw the line between “beliefs” and
Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881.
12
Williamson, [2005] UKHL 15 at [23]; Eweida, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at
para. 81.
11

2014.04.24 CHAKRABARTI.DOCX

5/11/2014 11:38 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

488

convictions that are idealistic, scientific, or political? What about
beliefs that are offensive or discriminatory? What if you are the
only person who holds your particular belief or you interpret your
religion in an idiosyncratic way?
These are questions that some find contentious. But in
general, a human rights-based approach lends itself to a generous
interpretation of the concept of what constitutes religion and
belief for the purposes of defining the scope of legal protection.
The seriousness of the belief, the extent to which it affects others,
and the number of people sharing it might all be relevant factors
in deciding whether any interference is justified, but it is surely
better not to shut out certain beliefs from being protected at all.
The last thing we want are judges—or employers, for that
matter—making value judgments about the types of beliefs that
are worthy of respect.
This is broadly what the House of Lords, formerly Britain’s
highest domestic court, was contemplating in Williamson.13 One
of the judges in the court below, the Court of Appeal, had
thought that a belief in the principle of “spare the rod and spoil
the child” did not qualify for protection as a religious belief at
all.14 However, that view was firmly rejected by the House of
Lords.15 Lord Nicholls said:
When the genuineness of a claimant’s
professed belief is an issue in the proceedings the
court will inquire into and decide this issue as a
question of fact. This is a limited inquiry. The
court is concerned to ensure an assertion of
religious belief is made in good faith: “neither
fictitious, nor capricious, and that it is not an
artifice”, . . . . But, emphatically, it is not for the
court to embark on an inquiry into the asserted
belief and judge its “validity” by some objective
standard such as the source material upon which

13
14

See Williamson, [2005] UKHL 15.

Regina (Williamson & Others) v. Sec’y of State for Educ. & Empl’t,
[2002] EWCA (Civ) 1926, [23], [2003] QB 1300 at 1310 (Eng.).
15
Williamson, [2005] UKHL 15 at [87].

2014.04.24 CHAKRABARTI.DOCX

5/11/2014 11:38 AM

FAITH IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE

489

the claimant founds his belief or the orthodox
teaching of the religion in question or the extent to
which the claimant’s belief conforms to or differs
from the views of others professing the same
religion. Freedom of religion protects the
subjective belief of an individual. [R]eligious belief
is intensely personal and can easily vary from one
individual to another. Each individual is at liberty
to hold his own religious beliefs, however
irrational or inconsistent they may seem to some,
however surprising.16

A. What Beliefs Are Worthy of Protection: The Approach of
the U.K. Employment Appeal Tribunal
The U.K. Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) considered
the scope of the concept of “philosophical belief” in McClintock
v. Department of Constitutional Affairs.17 The case concerned a
magistrate who refused to officiate because he might have had to
decide whether children should be placed for adoption with samesex partners and then resigned from his role in family law cases.18
The magistrate claimed that, in breach of the 2003 Regulations,
he had been discriminated against on the basis of his
philosophical beliefs. He did not say that he believed adoption by
same sex couples was wrong as a matter of principle; just that he
thought that there was no convincing evidence that it could be in
a child’s best interests.19 It also appears that the magistrate would
have been willing to change his mind in light of further
research.20
The EAT adopted the test for “philosophical belief” set out by
the European Court of Human Rights in Campbell & Cosans v.

16

Id. at [22].

17

McClintock v. Dep’t of Constitutional Affairs, [2007] I.R.L.R. 29,

available at 2007 WL 3130902.
18
Id. at [4].
19
Id. at [7].
20
Id.
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United Kingdom:21 that the belief must have sufficient cogency,

seriousness, cohesion, and importance, and be worthy of respect
in a democratic society.22 The EAT found that because Mr.
McClintock had never framed his objections on the basis of any
religious or philosophical belief, he fell outside the scope of the
2003 Regulations. The tribunal had correctly observed that it is
not enough “to have an opinion based on some real or perceived
logic or based on information or lack of information available.”23
McClintock demonstrates that while the courts will not judge
the “validity” of a claimant’s belief—a possibility ruled out in
Williamson—it will consider whether the purported belief is in
fact a belief based on principle, rather than a mere opinion based
on the available evidence. As it happens, if Mr. McClintock had
maintained a protected belief that it was simply wrong for samesex couples to adopt, then the outcome would surely have been
the same. But if religion is to enjoy neither a punished nor
privileged status in society, and accepting that all human beings
are to some extent creatures of logic and emotion, faith and
reason, there is no real justification for attempting to distinguish a
deeply held belief based on evidence from one taken on faith.
The scope of protection for religious and philosophical beliefs
in the U.K. has undoubtedly been extended by Grainger Plc v.
Nicholson, the “green martyr” case.24 Mr. Nicholson had been
dismissed by the defendant and the defendant claimed that the
dismissal was due to redundancy.25 Mr. Nicholson claimed that
he was discriminated against based on his asserted philosophical
belief in relation to climate change and the environment.26 The
question for some might be: why would a climate change
campaigner want a tribunal to treat his convictions as a
“philosophical belief” rather than as a scientific fact? The cynical
21

Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7511/76 , 4 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 293 (1982).
22
Id. at para. 36.
23
McClintock, [2007] I.R.L.R. 29 at [45].
24
Grainger Plc v. Nicholson, [2010] I.C.R. 360, available at
http://www.bailii.org/U.K./cases/U.K.EAT/2009/0219_09_0311.html.
25
Id. at [2].
26

Id.
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answer would be that it was the only way he could challenge his
dismissal. But actually, it seems the belief in issue was much
more than just a belief in climate change itself. It was also a
belief that we are all morally obliged to take urgent steps to
address the causes of climate change though our lifestyles and any
other means available. The EAT said that a belief of this kind—
provided it was of a similar cogency or status to a religious
belief—could fall within the legal framework designed to protect
faith and conscience in the workplace.27 If Mr. Nicholson was
made redundant simply for holding this belief, then why
shouldn’t he be entitled to a remedy from the Tribunal?
In his judgment, Justice Burton summarized the limitations on
the concept of “philosophical belief”:
(i) The belief must be genuinely held.
(ii) It must be a belief and not . . . an opinion or
viewpoint based on the present state of
information available.
(iii) It must be a belief as to a weighty and
substantial aspect of human life and
behaviour.
(iv) It must attain a certain level of cogency,
seriousness, cohesion and importance.
(v) It must be worthy of respect in a democratic
society, be not incompatible with human
dignity and not conflict with the fundamental
rights of others. 28
The scope of protection was considered again in Power v.
Greater Manchester Police Authority.29 Alan Power, a former
employee of the Police Authority, claimed that he was dismissed
because of his spiritualist faith and that his belief that psychics
should be used in criminal investigations.30 The judge in the
Employment Tribunal found that a belief in life after death and
the capacity to communicate with spirits “on the other side” had
27
28
29

Id. at [26].
Id. at [24].

Power v. Greater Manchester Police Auth., [2010] U.K.EAT
0087_10_0810, available at 2010 WL 4790841.
30
Id. at [3]–[7].
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the necessary cogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importance to
qualify as a belief worthy of respect in a democratic society. The
EAT upheld this decision and found that the test adopted in
Grainger was satisfied.31

B. Beliefs Held by Few People: The Approach of the
European Court of Human Rights
The cases decided by the U.K. EAT, discussed above,
demonstrate the breadth of the different types of beliefs that are
capable of protection in the U.K. What, though, about those
beliefs held by very few people? As Lord Nicholls recogized in
Williamson, religious belief is “intensely personal,”32 and it
would seem odd for protection to depend on whether the belief in
question is shared by others who are also put at a disadvantage.
However, that appeared to be the effect of the EAT’s
judgment in the case of Eweida v. British Airways Plc.33 The
issue in that case was whether British Airways’ (“BA”) uniform
policy—which prohibited Ms. Eweida from wearing a small cross
around her neck—was indirectly discriminatory on religious
grounds and therefore needed justification. Although it was not
in dispute that Ms. Eweida was a committed Christian, and that it
was a genuine and important part of her faith to wear her cross
visibly, the EAT found that there was no indirect discrimination
because Ms. Eweida had not shown that BA’s uniform policy
disadvantaged Christians as a group.34
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the EAT35
because there was no evidence that any other BA employee had
ever requested to wear a visible cross, or been deterred from
31
32

Id. at [17].

Regina (Williamson & Others) v. Secretary of State for Educ. &
Empl’t, [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 A.C. 246 [22].
33
Eweida v. British Airways Plc, [2009] I.C.R. 303 (Eng.), available at
2008 WL 4975445. Liberty represented Nadia Eweida in proceedings before
the national courts.
34
Id. at [62]–[63].
35
Eweida v. British Airways Plc, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 80, [2010] I.C.R.
890 (Eng.), available at 2010 WL 442383.
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doing so.36 Liberty argued that indirect discrimination should not
require a manifestation of belief to be shared between a group of
people with the same protected characteristic.37 Specifically, that
religion and the manifestation of belief is a deeply personal
matter and a human rights-based approach should be sensitive to
a genuine personal assessment of the requirements a faith places
on its adherents.38 Whether an act is a “manifestation” of what is
found to be a sincerely held religious belief should be judged by
the believer, him or herself. Care must be taken to avoid
engaging in any assessment of the validity of the belief that drives
certain actions.
Ms. Eweida successfully pursued her claim in the European
Court of Human Rights, under claims found through Article 9,
the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and
Article 14, the right to be free from discrimination.39 During its
judgment, the court considered the scope of the right to freedom
of thought, conscience, and religion. It reiterated that this right
protects views that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness,
cohesion, and importance. The court indicated that the view
reaches this level, and the state’s duty of neutrality and
impartiality is incompatible with any action by the state to assess
the legitimacy of someone’s religious beliefs or the way in which
those beliefs are expressed.40
However, the court acknowledged that not every act
which is in some way inspired, motivated or
influenced by it constitutes a “manifestation” of
the belief. Thus, for example, acts or omissions
which do not directly express the belief concerned
or which are only remotely connected to a precept
of faith fall outside the protection of Article 9, § 1.
In order to count as a “manifestation” within the
meaning of Article 9, the act in question must be
36
37
38

Id. at [8], [38].
Id. at [7].
See Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881.
39
Id. at para. 95.
40
Id. at para. 81.
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intimately linked to the religion or belief. An
example would be an act of worship or devotion
which forms part of the practice of a religion or
belief in a generally recognized form. However,
the manifestation of religion or belief is not limited
to such acts; the existence of a sufficiently close
and direct nexus between the act and the
underlying belief must be determined on the facts
of each case. In particular, there is no requirement
on the applicant to establish that he or she acted in
fulfilment of a duty mandated by the religion in
question.41
The court considered that Ms. Eweida’s insistence on wearing
a cross visibly at work was a manifestation of her religious belief
and that “the domestic authorities failed sufficiently to protect the
first applicant’s right to manifest her religion.”42 This was the
case notwithstanding that there was no evidence that any other
BA employee wished to manifest his or her religion in this way.43
The court found that BA’s uniform policy pursued a
legitimate aim “to communicate a certain image of the company
and to promote recognition of its brand and staff.”44 However, it
noted that Ms. Eweida’s desire to manifest her religious belief
was a fundamental right “because a healthy democratic society
needs to tolerate and sustain pluralism and diversity; but also
because of the value to an individual who has made religion a
central tent of his or her life to be able to communicate that belief
to others.”45 The court found that the domestic courts had given
too much weight to BA’s desire to maintain a certain corporate
image, especially since Ms. Eweida’s cross was discrete and did
not detract from her appearance, and there was no evidence that it
would have impacted BA’s brand or image.46 Moreover, BA was
able to amend its uniform policy to allow for the wearing of
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. at para. 82 (citations omitted).
Id. at para. 95.
Id. at para. 94.
Id. at para. 93.
Id. at para. 94.
Id.
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religious symbolic jewelry, which demonstrated that the
prohibition was not fundamentally important.47
The European Court’s finding that Ms. Eweida’s rights were
breached even though no other BA employee had been shown to
have been affected by the rule is the correct approach. A
particular method of manifesting a belief does not need to be
widely shared to be worthy of protection.

C. Beliefs Held by Few People: The Approach of the U.K.
Tax Tribunal
The European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Eweida
was applied by the first-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) in
Blackburn v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners.48 The
claimants were members of the Seventh-day Adventist Church
who were refused an exemption from a requirement to file VAT
returns online on religious grounds.49 The judge found if he had
to make a decision purely using the normal rules of construction,
without reference to the Human Rights Act 1998, he would have
found that the claimants were not entitled to an exemption.50
While the claimants were members of the Seventh-day Adventist
Church, the Church did not consider its beliefs to be incompatible
with the use of electronic communications.51 Indeed, the
claimants did not object to the use of all electronic
communications, but just to the use of computers, the internet,
television, and mobile phones.52 However, the judge reached a
different conclusion in light of the claimants’ rights under Article
9.53
Continuing the reasoning applied in Eweida, the judge took a
47

Id.

48

Blackburn v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs, [2013] U.K.FTT 525
(TC), available at http://www.bailii.org/U.K./cases/U.K.FTT/TC/2013/
TC02913.pdf.
49
Id. at [12], [16].
50
Id. at [33].
51
Id. at [12].
52
53

Id.
Id. at [44]–[62].
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broad approach to the assessment of whether the claimant’s
Article 9 rights were violated and found that the claimants were
manifesting their religious beliefs through their refusal to use
computers.54 While the Revenue and Customs Commissioners did
accept that the claimants’ beliefs attained the necessary “level of
cogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importance to obtain
protection” under Article 955 they still argued that there was not
a “sufficiently close and direct nexus between the act and the
underlying belief.”56 The judge rejected this argument saying:
Indeed, as [the claimant] explained it, in shunning
computers he and his wife are acting in what they
see as fulfilment of a duty mandated by their
religion, in that he and his wife believe that they
must act in accordance with their conscience in
order to be judged righteous at the second coming.
And their conscience dictated that they shun
computers. In this, therefore, it is apparent to me
the manifestation of their religious beliefs in
shunning computers is acting in fulfilment of a
duty mandated by their religion as they perceive it
to be. This is clearly within the meaning of
“manifestation” in Article 9 as explained by the
ECHR in [Eweida v. United Kingdom].57
The judge found that the requirement to file VAT returns
online was in fact a restriction on the claimants’ rights under
Article 9 and that there was no justification for the restriction.58
These cases demonstrate the effectiveness of a practical human
rights based approach to the protection of religious and
philosophical beliefs. The courts correctly acknowledge that it
would be inappropriate to adopt a narrow definition of “belief” in
order to exclude protection of certain groups. Furthermore, the
courts recognize that a measure does not need to affect a wide

54
55
56
57
58

Id. at [52].
Id. at [50].
Id.
Id. at [51]–[52].
Id. at [59]–[62].
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group of people who share the same beliefs in order to infringe
on a person’s right to express his or her belief; even beliefs held
by a small minority are worthy of protection.
II. HOW FAR MUST WE GO
MANIFESTATION OF BELIEFS?

TO

ACCOMMODATE

THE

Real respect for freedom of thought, conscience, and belief
requires that we be slow to interfere, doing so only when such
intervention is necessary and proportionate to protecting the
rights and freedoms of others. Generally, it is easier to justify
intervention in the context of young children than with adults. It
is also easier to justify intervention in the context of employment
when a public official, in particular, cannot practically perform
his or her reasonable duties or refuses to apply the law of the land
and the principle of non-discrimination to those that he or she
serves. Intervention is also easier to justify with regard to the
provision of goods and services when those engaged in
commercial activity seek to discriminate when deciding who they
will and will not serve.

A. The Religious Beliefs of Public Officials
The question of how to deal with religious beliefs that are
discriminatory in nature has recently come to the forefront in a
number of important cases involving public officials. One such
case involved Ms. Ladele, a Christian registrar in Islington
Council who said that she could not conduct Civil Partnerships
because it would involve her participation in creating a union that
was “contrary to God’s laws.”59 Although an Employment
Tribunal originally upheld Ms. Ladele’s claim that she had been
directly and indirectly discriminated against on grounds of her
religion, that decision was reversed by the EAT.60 Ms. Ladele’s
appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, since the local
59

Ladele v. Islington London Borough Council, [2009] EWCA Civ.
1357, at [10] (Eng.).
60
Id. at [3]. It is believed that Liberty was the first NGO to ever intervene
in the Tribunal in the public interest.
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authority was pursuing the legitimate aim of providing effective
service by requiring Ms. Ladele to be designated as a registrar
for civil partnerships.61 The court also found that the local
authority was complying with its overarching policy of being
committed to the promotion of equal opportunities, which
required its employees to act in a way that does not discriminate
against others.62
Ms. Ladele complained to the European Court of Human
Rights,63 which found that there had been no breach of Ms.
Ladele’s rights under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9.64
Unfortunately, while the European Court upheld the U.K.’s
position, it found that the issue fell within the Contracting States’
margin of appreciation.65 The court noted that the consequences
for Ms. Ladele were particularly serious as her refusal to be
designated as a civil partnership registrar resulted in her facing
disciplinary action and losing her job.66 However, the national
authorities were pursuing a legitimate aim and they had not
exceeded the wide margin of appreciation that the court generally
allows national authorities when balancing competing rights.67
The local authority had offered Ms. Ladele a compromise
whereby she would be required to carry out straightforward
61
62

Id.
Id. at [40].

Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881.
64
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights states:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 230 [hereinafter European Convention
on Human Rights]. Article 14 does not provide a freestanding right not to be
discriminated against, and in order to rely on Article 14, a claimant must be
able to show that another of their rights under the Convention is engaged.
65
Eweida, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 61.
66
Id. at para. 102.
67
Id. at para. 106.
63
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signings of the civil partnership register and administrative work
in connection with civil partnerships, but she would not be
required to conduct ceremonies.68
This case is perhaps a paradigm of a justified interference
with someone’s expression of his or her religion. Ms. Ladele was
a public official who would not carry out functions which she
thought conflicted with her beliefs, notwithstanding that those
functions had been introduced by a democratically elected
Parliament, and the refusal to do the work amounted to unlawful
discrimination. Islington’s stance was not based on practicality—it
could have provided the civil partnerships service without her—
but was a matter of principle. The local authority could not be
seen as condoning unlawful discrimination.
It would be nonsense if Islington were obliged to
accommodate Ms. Ladele’s belief on the one hand, and have a
duty not to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation on the
other. Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is now
unlawful in the U.K. and is treated equally with discrimination
based on race, sex, and indeed religious discrimination. It would
undermine the whole system of equality protection if public
officials were allowed to engage in what would otherwise be
unlawful discrimination because of their personal beliefs.

B. The Religious Beliefs of Those Providing Goods and
Services to the Public
In a recent case the U.K. Supreme Court had to decide the
issue of how far we should go to accommodate religious belief.
The case of Bull v. Hall69 involved Christian bed and breakfast
owners who turned away a gay couple—who had booked a double
room—because of a sincerely held belief that sexual intercourse
outside of traditional marriage is sinful.70 The court used the
broad approach to the assessment of Article 971 rights taken in
68

Id. at para. 26.

69

Bull v. Hall, [2013] U.K.SC 73, available at 2013 WL 6148231.
Id. at [9]–[10].
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides:

70
71
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Eweida and Blackburn, but while the court accepted that the right

to manifest religious belief was clearly engaged, the reasoning in
Ladele prevailed.72 Supreme Court Justice Lady Hale, strongly
made the case that the moniker of religious freedom did not
sanction discrimination in the provision of goods and services:
Homosexuals . . . were long denied the possibility
of fulfilling themselves through relationships with
others. This was an affront to their dignity as
human beings which our law has now (some would
say belatedly) recognised. Homosexuals can enjoy
the same freedom and the same relationships as
any others. But we should not underestimate the
continuing legacy of those centuries of
discrimination, persecution even, which is still
going on in many parts of the world. It is no doubt
for that reason that Strasbourg requires “very
weighty reasons” to justify discrimination on the
grounds of sexual orientation. It is for that reason
that we should be slow to accept that prohibiting
hotel keepers from discriminating against
homosexuals is a disproportionate limitation on
their right to manifest their religion.73
This conclusion aligned with Liberty’s intervention before the
U.K. Supreme Court in this case. Liberty argued that the better
approach to balancing competing rights is to broadly read Article
9, treat the limitation as interference, and when it comes to the
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion
or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 64, art. 9.
72
Bull, [2013] U.K.SC 73.
73
Id. at [53].
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issue of justification, give significant weight to the importance of
affording lesbians and gay men equality in accessing services and
in the enjoyment of other social privileges. The court also made it
clear that its decision was not a matter of preferring one protected
characteristic or one set of rights to another. The result would
have been the same if a gay hotel owner sought to turn away a
Christian couple on the grounds of their beliefs.74
When sexual orientation regulations first came into force in
the U.K., there was considerable debate about whether
exemptions should be allowed on religious grounds leading to
some concessions. Religious bodies continue to be allowed to
discriminate on the grounds of sexual orientation in certain
limited circumstances.75 Those lines are drawn by Parliament and
those individuals who disagree with those lines should lobby for a
change in the law. However, no individual can ask their employer
or the courts to extend the scope of the exemptions. I accept that
it is difficult for people who are in public or business roles to
adapt to changes in the law with which they fundamentally
disagree, but which also have a significant impact on how they
conduct their role or business. But that’s what it means to live in
a democracy and you either accept it or, if you feel that strongly
about it, you should find another job. There comes a time when
the pacifist has to leave the army rather than insist on his pacifism
therein.
There will be many other cases that are not as clear cut as
those described above, and it is the task of employers and courts
to try to come to sensible conclusions. One such example is the
case of the Christian bus driver who refused to drive buses
carrying the slogan “There’s probably no god.”76 His employer
recognized that this might be upsetting for him and agreed to try
74
75

Id. at [54].

For example, the exemptions from employment equality legislation
allow religious employers to discriminate against potential applicants for jobs
on grounds of religion or belief and of sexual orientation, and to discriminate
against current employees on those same grounds. The Equality Act, 2010, c.
15, § 196, sch. 23 (U.K.).
76
Man Refuses to Drive “No God” Bus, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.U.K./2/hi/U.K._news/england/hampshire/7832647.stm.
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to put him on other routes, as long as this did not inconvenience
other drivers.77 The driver accepted this and agreed that if it
became impracticable to accommodate him, he would have to
find another job.78 Sadly, those sorts of stories of tolerance and
common sense are either rare, or more likely, rarely reported.
The cases of Ladele and Bull v. Hall demonstrate that
interference with respect for religious freedom in the provision of
public and business services can be justified. For example such
interferences may be justified in particular security or safety
scenarios where an item of clothing must be temporarily removed
to allow for a respectful identity check at an airport or sterile
conditions in parts of a hospital. But the rights and freedoms of
others, in my view, do not include protection from difference,
irritation, and offense, as opposed to real harm, whether the
individual concerned is in a religious, political, or other minority.

C. The Right to Wear Religious Clothing in Public: The
French Approach
An example of grossly disproportionate interference with
religious freedom is the recent introduction in France of a law
banning the wearing of clothing designed to conceal the face in
public spaces.79 The law imposes penalties on individuals who
coerce others into wearing clothing that covers their face and on
those wearing such clothing.80 There are only limited exceptions
to the ban, for example: clothing permitted by law or on medical
or other grounds, worn for sport, festivities, or artistic or
traditional events.81 Although the law is framed in neutral terms,
one effect is to prohibit the wearing of the burkha in public
77
78
79

Id.
Id.

Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du
visage dans l’espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 on the
Prohibition of Concealing the Face in Public Space], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12,
2010, p. 18344.
80
Id. arts. 3, 4.
81
Id. art. 1.
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places, and it is a troubling example of the rising anti-Islamic
sentiment in Europe.82
The French law has been challenged in the European Court of
Human Rights and was recently transferred to the Grand
Chamber where judgment is pending.83 The challenge was
brought by a devout Muslim French national who wears a burkha
and niqab84 because of her faith, culture, and personal
convictions, and who is not pressured to do so by her husband or
her family. The applicant is happy not to wear the niqab in
certain circumstances, but would like to have the option of
wearing it in public. The applicant is relying on Articles 3
(prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment), 8
(right to respect for private and family life), 9 (right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion), 10 (right to freedom of
expression), 11 (right to freedom of assembly and association),
and 14 (prohibition on discrimination) of the European
Convention on Human Rights.85 Liberty has intervened in the
application and argued that the French ban is an unjustified
interference with various human rights.86 Our submission was
based on three propositions.
First, the law clearly interferes with freedom of religion.
Following the decision of the European Court in Eweida,87 it is
See, e.g., Homa Khaleeli, Islamophobic Hate Crime: Is It Getting
Worse?, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/U.K./
82

2013/jun/05/islamophobic-hate-crime-getting-worse; Christine Ogan, et al.,

The Rise of Anti-Muslim Prejudice: Media and Islamophobia in Europe and
the United States, 76 INT’L COMM. GAZETTE 46 (2014);
83

Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber
Hearing Concerning the Prohibition on Wearing the Full-Face Veil in Public in
France (Nov. 27, 2013).
84
Id. There are many different recognized spellings of “niqab.” I will
adopt this spelling throughout this article, except in quotations that use another
recognized spelling.
85
See Brief for Intervenor at 5–7, S.A.S. v. France,
App. No. 43835/11, available at http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.U.K./
sites/default/files/SAS%20v%20France%20-%20Written%20Subs.pdf;
see
also European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 64, art. 3, 8–11, 14.
86
Brief for Intervenor, S.A.S. v. France, at 5–7.
87
Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
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clear that it is not for a court to decide whether the applicant’s
choice to wear a veil is a valid manifestation of her religion. Nor
is it a court’s role to question the extent to which other members
of the applicant’s religious group share her belief in the
importance of wearing the burkha and niqab. In previous cases,
the European court had dismissed claims for religious
discrimination in the employment context because the applicants
could choose to resign from their position if it conflicted with
their religious beliefs.88 The court moved away from this
approach in Eweida, but even if it had not done so, these cases
can be distinguished from the French ban—women who wish to
wear a burkha in public do not have the option of resigning to
avoid the impact of the law; it affects every aspect of their lives.
Second, the ban interferes with an applicant’s right with
respect to her private and family life under Article 8 because it
affects her ability to establish a social life and develop
relationships with others. The ban also affects the applicant’s
right, under Article 10, to express her faith by wearing a burkha.
Third, the effect of the law is discriminatory as it significantly
disadvantages Muslim women who choose to wear the burkha.
The French law appears to have three potential justifications: (1)
it is contrary to Republican values for a person to be cut off from
others; (2) there may be a danger to public safety; and (3) the
wearing of the burkha is a public manifestation of a lack of
equality between men and women. Liberty, however, argued that
these interferences with individuals’ human rights cannot be
justified.
On closer inspection, these justifications are flawed. Whilst
secularism is an important value in France, the law specifically
affects the wearing of the burkha but does not prevent people
from wearing other religious dress or symbols. There is no sound
reason for this difference in treatment. Security concerns also do
not provide an answer. A requirement to remove a face covering
in certain circumstances may be justified, but a complete ban on
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881.
88
See, e.g., id. at para. 83; Stedman v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R.
Rep 20 (1997); Konttinen v. Finland, App. No. 24949/94, 87 Eur. Comm’n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 68 (1996).
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wearing the burkha is clearly disproportionate. Many women who
wear the burkha would be willing to show their faces for
identification purposes and it is not clear that the existing French
laws regarding identity checks provide insufficient protection for
public security. Finally, while promoting equality is an important
aim, punishing women for expressing their faith does not support
equality. A law based on clumsy assumptions about what drives a
woman to wear the veil disregards her individual autonomy. By
forcing women to comply with a particular notion of equality, the
law undermines their dignity as women and as Muslims and has
the effect of barring them from some public spaces altogether.89

D. The Right to Wear Religious Clothing in Public: the U.K.
Approach
The issues surrounding the wearing of religious clothing in
public are not limited to France and have been considered in the
U.K. One example is the case of Azmi, which concerned a
classroom assistant who was not allowed to wear a niqab.90
Although the school’s decision to refuse to allow Azmi to wear
the niqab was ultimately found to be justified, the EAT rigorously
scrutinized the school’s reasons.91 This was an unusual case
because a religious dress requirement arguably did have a
negative impact on others. Ms. Azmi’s job primarily involved
language support for pupils for whom English was not their first
language. She was permitted to wear the niqab outside the
classroom but not while teaching. General research and
observation of her teaching showed that language support could
be carried out more effectively if her face was visible. On that
basis, the EAT decided that the school’s approach was not
unlawful.92
89

It is important to note that the applicants in these cases do not consider
themselves to be pressured into wearing the burkha and the niqab, but rather,
it is an expression of their religious faith.
90
Azmi v. Kirklees Metro. Borough Council, [2007] I.C.R. 1154 (Eng.).
91
Id. at [62]–[74].
92
Id. at [66], [80]. One interesting aspect of the case was that Ms. Azmi
suggested that the situation could be resolved by isolating her from male
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A similar issue was considered by the House of Lords,
formerly the U.K.’s highest court, in the cases of R (SB) v. Head
Teacher and Governors of Denbigh High School93 and R (X) v.
Head Teacher and Governors of Y School.94 These cases
concerned claims by Muslim girls who asserted a right to wear a
jilbab and a niqab, respectively, at school. The court dismissed
these claims on the basis that there was no interference with the
girls’ right to freedom of religion under Article 9 because they
could have gone to schools that would have allowed them to wear
the religious garments.95
A more recent example involves the issue of whether a
defendant charged with witness intimidation should be allowed to
wear the niqab during a trial in the Crown Court.96 In his
judgment on September 16, 2013, H.H. Judge Peter Murphy set
out general principles on when defendants in the Crown Court
should be allowed to wear clothing that covers their face. 97 The
judge gave detailed consideration to the human rights issues
involved. He noted the importance of the right to freedom of
religion, but stated that the corollary of this right is a duty to
respect legal institutions and a court’s rules and practices. The
judge also considered the fundamental requirements of an
adversarial trial and the need for the court to be able to judge the
defendant’s reaction and to prevent the defendant from being
immunized from effective cross-examination. Furthermore, in
order to protect the administration of justice, the court—and not
teachers. The school refused to do this, which was surely right because it
could have led to claims of direct sex discrimination by male teachers.
93
R (on the Application of Begum) v. Headteacher & Governors of
Denbigh High Sch., [2006] UKHL 15, available at 2006 WL 690559.
94
R (on the application of X) v. Headteachers of Y Sch., [2007] EWHC
298 (Admin) (Eng.), available at 2007 WL 675365.
95
See Begum, [2006] UKHL 15, at [25]; Application of X, [2007]
EWHC, 298 at [40].
96
The Queen v. D(R), Judgment of H.H. Judge Peter
Murphy In Relation to Wearing Niqaab by Defendant During
Proceedings in Crown Court (Sept. 16, 2013) (U.K.), available at
http://www.judiciary.gov.U.K./Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/The%2
0Queen%20-v-%20D%20(R).pdf.
97

Id.
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the defendant—must be in control of its procedure.98
The judge recognized the importance of wearing a niqab to
many Muslin women. He said:
I also recognise the intrinsic merit which the
niqaab has in the eyes of women who wear it. I
reject the view, which has its adherents among the
public and the press, that the niqaab is somehow
incompatible with participation in public life in
England and Wales; or is nothing more than a
form of abuse, imposed under the guise of
religion, on women by men. There may be
individual cases where that is true. But the niqaab
is worn by choice by many spiritually-minded,
thoughtful and intelligent women, who do not
deserve to be demeaned by superficial and
uninformed criticisms of their choice. The Court
must consider the potential positive benefits of the
niqaab.99
In the end, the judge conducted a balancing exercise between
the defendant’s right to freedom of religion and the rights of
others involved in the trial such as the victims, the jurors, and the
rights of the public generally. He concluded that it would be
appropriate to have some restrictions on when a niqab could be
worn during the trial and set out principles on how the issues
should be dealt with. For example, a female officer could be
asked to confirm the defendant’s identity to the court, and while
the defendant would have to remove the niqab to give evidence,
she could give evidence behind a screen or by video link so that
she could not be seen by the general public.
The H.H. Judge Peter Murphy found that restrictions on the
nijab in court furthered the legitimate aim of protecting the fair
and effective running of the criminal courts. He also held that
some restrictions on the defendant’s right to freedom of religion
were necessary and proportionate to uphold the rule of law in a

98
99

Id.
Id. at para. 67.
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democratic society.100 This judgment is an example of a court
adopting a nuanced, principled, and practical approach that
respects a defendant’s religious convictions while protecting the
administration of justice. This can be contrasted with the blanket
ban in France on wearing the burkha or niqab in public, which is
dismissive of an individual’s right to express his or her religious
convictions.
Unfortunately, not everybody in the U.K. adopts such a
sensible approach to this issue. There have been calls for the
U.K. to introduce a ban—similar to the one introduced in
France101—on wearing a burkha in public. A Conservative
Member of Parliament, Philip Hollobone, has introduced a
private member’s bill, the Face Coverings (Prohibition) Bill,
which would make it an offense for a person to wear a garment
with the primary purpose of obscuring one’s face in a public
place.102 While the U.K. government does not support the Bill,
and it currently has little prospect of success, its mere
introduction demonstrates the rising tide of intolerance that is
sweeping across Europe.103 This trend is further evidenced by a
recent YouGov poll conducted in the U.K. in September 2013
that showed that 61% of British adults agreed with the statement:
“the burka should be banned in Britain.”104 It is to be welcomed,
therefore, that the European Court of Human Rights has been
developing a more thoughtful approach to religious freedom in its
recent cases.

100
101
102

Id. at paras. 81–85.
See Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 (Fr.), supra note 79.

Face Coverings (Prohibition) Bill, 2013-14, H.C. Bill [31] (Eng.).
See, e.g., Morgane Hoarau & Patrycja Sasnal, The Rise of
Islamophobia in Europe, POLISH INST. INT’L AFFAIRS BULLETIN, May 27,
2013, at 1.
104
William Jordan, Most Still Want to Ban the Burka in Britain, YOUGOV
(Sept. 18, 2013), http://yougov.co.U.K./news/2013/09/18/most-still-want-banburka-britain/.
103
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E. The Approach of the European Court of Human Rights to
Religious Freedom
The European Court’s approach, which is perhaps inevitable
for an international court grappling with such diverse national
traditions, initially seems to favor secularism. There are a
number of cases in which the court said that a person is entitled
to his or her beliefs, but there are limitations on his or her right
to express those beliefs in the public sphere. Following this
reasoning the court found no interference with Article 9 in the
case of a woman who was refused permission to graduate from
university unless she was prepared to be photographed without a
headscarf,105 or in the case of a teacher who was not allowed time
off to attend religious worship on a Friday.106 Even when the
court did find that there was interference, it was often accepted
that the restrictions were justified. One example is the court’s
refusal to hear a complaint about a requirement mandating turban
removal during airport security screening.107
The European Court’s approach of favoring secularism is best
demonstrated by the case of Dahlab v. Switzerland.108 In this case
the European Court found that a refusal to allow a primary school
teacher to wear the hijab (not the niqab, just the headscarf) was
justified in view of the “powerful external symbol” that wearing a
headscarf represented, specifically that the hijab could be seen as
having a kind of proselytizing effect since it appeared to be
imposed on women by a religious precept that was hard to
reconcile with the principle of gender equality.109 The court found
that wearing the hijab undermined the message of tolerance,
respect for others, and equality and non-discrimination that all
teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils.110
However, in more recent cases the European Court has begun
105

Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90, 74 Eur. Comm’n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 93 (1993).
106
Ahmad v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 126 (1981).
107
See Phull v. France, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 409.
108
Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R 447.
109
Id. at 450.
110

Id.
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to show a greater tolerance for religion in the public sphere. A
recent example is the case of Lautsi v. Italy,111 which concerned a
state school in Italy that had a crucifix fixed to the wall in each of
its classrooms.112 The applicant wanted to give her two children,
who attended the school, a secular upbringing, and thought that
the crucifix displays interfered with that goal.113 She claimed that
the crucifix presentation breached her right under Article 2 of
Protocol No. 1114 to educate her children in accordance with her
religious and philosophical beliefs. She also claimed that it
breached her right to freedom of religion under Article 9 and was
discriminatory and contrary to Article 14.115
In 2009, a chamber of the court adopted the secularist
approach and found that there had been a breach of Article 2 of
Protocol No. 1 and Article 9.116 The court found that the state had
“an obligation to refrain from imposing beliefs, even indirectly,
in places where persons are dependent on it or in places where
they were particularly vulnerable.”117 It noted that in countries
where the majority of the population is members of one religion,
the use of the symbols of that religion without restriction as to
place and manner could constitute pressure on students who do
not practice that religion.118 The court found that while the
crucifix had a number of meanings, the predominant meaning was
a religious one.119 The crucifixes could be considered “powerful
external symbols” and could be emotionally disturbing for
children of other religions or those who were not religious at
111

Lautsi v. Italy, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 3 (2012).
Id. at para. 11.
113
Id. at para. 12.
114
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 64, art. 2 (“No
person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions
which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall
respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in
conformity with their own religions and philosophical convictions.”).
115
Lautsi, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 29.
116
Id. at para. 30.
117
Id. at para. 31.
112

118
119

Id.
Id.
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all.120 The court could not see “how the display of a symbol that
it is reasonable to associate with Catholicism . . . could serve the
educational pluralism which is essential for the preservation of
‘democratic society’. . . .”121
This decision was reviewed by the Grand Chamber, which
came to the conclusion that there had been no violation of Article
2 of Protocol No. 1 or of Article 9.122 The Grand Chamber
acknowledged that states are responsible for ensuring neutral and
impartial exercise of various religions, faiths, and beliefs. It also
noted though that states are not prohibited from imparting
religious or philosophical knowledge either directly or
indirectly.123 In addition, the aim of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 is
to safeguard pluralism in education and to ensure that knowledge
is conveyed in “an objective, critical, and pluralistic manner,
enabling pupils to develop a critical mind.”124
The Grand Chamber thus held that the decision to display
crucifixes in state schools fell within the state’s “margin of
appreciation and therefore was allowed.”125 The court said that
they had a duty to respect states’ decisions relating to the
organization of the school environment, and the setting and
planning of the curriculum, provided that they did not lead to a
form of indoctrination.126 Since the crucifix is essentially a
passive symbol, its display alone is insufficient to denote a
process of indoctrination and did not have the same effect as
“didactic speech or participation in religious activities.”127
The court’s softer approach is also demonstrated by the cases
of Eweida and Ladele, discussed above, as well as Chaplin, and
120
121

Id. at para. 73.
Id. at para. 31.

122

The Grand Chamber is made up of seventeen judges: the court’s
President and Vice-Presidents, the Section Presidents and the national judge,
together with other judges selected by drawing of lots. The judgment of the
Grand Chamber is final.
123
Lautsi, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 at para. 60.
124
Id. at para. 62.
125
Id. at para. 70.
126
127

Id.
Id. at para. 72.
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McFarlane, which were all heard simultaneously by the European

Court of Human Rights.128 In its decision, the European Court
noted that previously it had held that the possibility of resigning
from a job meant that there was no interference with the
employee’s religious freedom.129 However, it suggested that those
decisions were not consistent with the court’s approach to other
rights, such as the right to respect for private life under Article 8,
or the right to freedom of expression under Article 10, and said:
Given the importance in a democratic society of
freedom of religion, the Court considers that,
where an individual complains of a restriction on
freedom of religion in the workplace, rather than
holding that the possibility of changing jobs would
negate any interference with the right, the better
approach would be to weigh the possibility in the
overall balance when considering whether or not
the restriction was proportionate.130
It is therefore clear that, from the perspective of the
Strasbourg jurisprudence, employers with policies that restrict
their employees’ ability to manifest their religious beliefs will
potentially be interfering with their employees’ rights under
Article 9. The employer must then demonstrate that its policies
are justified. The court applied this approach to the individual
circumstances of the four claimants with differing results. The
facts of Eweida and Ladele have already been discussed above.131
The facts of the other two cases, Chaplin and McFarlane, also
illustrate the court’s approach.
Ms. Chaplin was a nurse on a geriatric ward who wished to
wear a cross on a chain around her neck; however, this was
contrary to the ward’s uniform policy.132 Her managers believed
that there was a risk of injury if one of the patients pulled the
chain or if it swung forward and came into contact with an open
Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881.
129
Id. at para. 83.
128

130
131
132

Id.
See supra Part I.A.
Eweida, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 96.
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wound.133 The court found that here the hospital’s goal of
protecting health and safety was more important than British
Airways’ goal of protecting its corporate image.134 In this
instance, the court gave the domestic authorities a wide margin of
appreciation since the hospital managers were best placed to make
decisions about clinical safety.
Mr. McFarlane was a counselor who, because of his orthodox
Christian beliefs, refused to provide psycho-sexual counseling to
same-sex couples.135 This breached his employer’s policy that
required employees to provide services equally to heterosexual
and homosexual couples and McFarlane was let go. The court did
note that the loss of Mr. McFarlane’s job was a serious
sanction.136 However, when Mr. McFarlane had begun his
training course, he was aware of his employer’s equal
opportunities policy and that he would not be able to filter clients
on the ground of sexual orientation. The most important factor
for the court was that the employer’s action was intended to
secure its policy of providing services without discrimination.137
The state authorities therefore had a wide margin of appreciation.
These cases provide grounds for optimism that, when the
Grand Chamber gives its judgment in S.A.S. v. France,138 it will
take the opportunity to build on its recent jurisprudence in
Eweida and Lautsi.
CONCLUSION
I have sympathy with a human rights-based approach to
grappling with discrimination arguments, particularly in the
context of belief. Domestic law governing faith and belief in the
U.K. and all sensible workplace policies should be applied with
Id.
Id. at paras. 98–100; see also supra Part I.B discussing Eweida v.
British Airways Plc, [2009] I.C.R. 303 (Eng.), available at 2008 WL
133
134

4975445.
135
136
137
138

Eweida, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 107.
Id.
Id. at paras. 108–10.
S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R.
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the fundamental right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion in mind.
I advocate for a broad and generous approach to what is
considered a “protected religion or belief,” such as the approach
adopted by the U.K. EAT. This approach minimizes unattractive,
divisive, and counterproductive arguments about which personal
beliefs are worthy and unworthy of protection per se.
Having adopted a broad approach to what constitutes a
protected religion or belief, it is then necessary to accommodate
the manifestation of those beliefs and to only interfere with them
when it is necessary and proportionate to do so in order to protect
the rights of others. Deciding what is and is not a proportionate
interference or unreasonable accommodation can of course be a
tricky task in the workplace and the public sphere. There will of
course be situations in which it is appropriate to interfere with
those rights, the cases of Ladele and Bull v. Hall being obvious
examples. However, the best discipline comes from testing
alternative scenarios with the principle of non-discrimination and
equal treatment itself. Would British Airways have banned the
wearing of a headscarf or turban amongst its workforce? On the
evidence, patently not. Should a council accommodate a registrar
who refuses to officiate over mixed-race weddings? Is an atheist
who believes that Christian doctrine is counter to the “laws of
physics” best qualified to be a minister of that religion? I suspect
most of us would answer my last two questions in the negative.
It is encouraging to see the European Court of Human Rights
moving away from a secularist approach and adopting a more
balanced approach to issues of religious freedom that gives
appropriate weight to individuals’ religious convictions.
However, it is unfortunate that some national governments have
moved the other way, as is demonstrated by the French ban on
the wearing of the burkha or niqab in public, which undermines
many Muslim women’s rights to express their religious beliefs.
Nobody ever said that life in a rich, diverse democracy was
easy, or that the public sphere and workplace wouldn’t be a place
of occasional tension and strife. Our human rights framework
offers a robust tool for negotiating the limits of otherwise vague
terms like “tolerance” and “cohesion.” Inevitably, the laws that
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afford some protection to those whose beliefs are irritating, or
even offensive to us, protect us as well. To quote St. Matthew’s
Gospel: “Judge not, that ye be not judged. For with what
judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye
mete, it shall be measured to you again.”139 Or, if you prefer a
secular Matthew, try the words of fictional Congressman Matt
Santos from the Gospel according to Aaron Sorkin’s The West
Wing:
The framers of our Constitution believed that if the
people were to be sovereign and belong to
different religions at the same time then our
official religion would have to be no religion at all.
It was a bold experiment then as it is now. It
wasn’t meant to make us comfortable, it was meant
to make us free.140

139
140

Matthew 7:1–2.
The West Wing: Mr. Frost (NBC television broadcast Oct. 16, 2005).

